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to State v. Hargett in which the prosecution's evidence tends to
show that Hargett co-operated in the crime. In most states, one involv-
ed in the joint commission of a crime is as guilty as the perpetrator
of the act.29 Since Hargett knew the identity of the actual perpetrator,
the burden would shift to him to show that he was not the perpe-
trator. If he could not do this, it can be inferred that he was the one
who pushed Weingardner into the ditch. This rule would not alter the
state's burden of proof as to the accused's guilt, but would merely place
upon Hargett the burden of producing evidence as to his part in the
event.
In essence, once the prosecution produces evidence showing that
the two persons co-operated in the crime, thereby making one as
guilty as the other, it should not be required to convince the jury
beyond a reasonable doubt of their respective functions in the act.
RICHARD K. WHITE, JR.
ATTACHMENT FOR A FOREIGN TORT
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania is authorized by statute' to
prescribe forms of action, writs and other rules of civil procedure for
the courts of Pennsylvania. In order to carry out this function, the
statute authorizes the court to suspend Acts of Assembly, provided
neither the substantive laws nor the jurisdiction of the court is
abridged, enlarged or modified. Under this authority, the Supreme
this rule, Justice Holmes said: "It is consistent with all the constitutional pro-
tections of accused men to throw on them the burden of proving facts peculiarly
within their knowledge and hidden from discovery by the government." Casey
v. United States, 276 U-S. 413, 418 (1928).
'The reasoning behind such a rule is expressed in Benge v. Commonwealth, 92
Ky. i, 27 S.W 146 (1891): "This is for the reason that each is the agent and
instrument of the other, and his act is the act of the other, and the act of each
constitutes but one crime, and each is guilty of the act actually committed by the
other. Such act is, in law, the act of each. Hence each is principal as to each act,
although he did not actually perpetrate each act; but the act that the other perpe-
trated was his act, and he is principal as to it."
'Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 17 § 61 (Supp. 196o) provides in part that: "the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania shall have the power to prescribe by general rule the forms
of actions, process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the practice and procedure in
civil actions at law and in equity Provided, That such rules shall be consistent
with the Constitution of this Commonwealth and shall neither abridge, enlarge
nor modify the substantive rights of any litigant nor the juisdiction of any of the
said courts nor affect any statute of limitations."
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Court adopted Rule 1252 which provides in part that a writ of foreign
attachment may issue to attach property of a defendant upon any
cause of action at law or in equity in which the relief sought in-
cludes a judgment or decree for the payment of money.
2
Prior to the promulgation of Rule 1252, a 1937 Pennsylvania Act
of Assembly3 limited writs of foreign attachment to torts committed
within the Commonwealth.4 So the question arises as to whether the
court has the power to suspend the Act of 1937 and thereby extend
the availability of the writ to any ex delicto action irrespective of
where the tort occurred. The problem turns upon whether or not
such a change affects either the substantive rights of the parties or
the jurisdiction of the court.
The question was squarely presented in the recent case of Alpers
v. New Jersey Bell Telephone Co.5 The plaintiff, a resident of Penn-
sylvania, was injured in an auto collision involving a vehicle owned
by the defendant, a New Jersey corporation. The plaintiff attached
property of the defendant in the possession of the Pennsylvania Bell
Telephone Co.6 The lower court dismissed the action and this was
affiirmed by the state supreme court. The majority held that foreign
actions ex delicto were not within the scope of Rule 1252. The ma-
jority concluded that in view of the clear restriction of the writ of
foreign attachment in actions ex delicto to torts committed within the
Commonwealth, both by statutory and case law prior to the promul-
gation of Rule 1252, it was certainly not intended that Rule 1252
should change or alter in any manner a role so firmly established and
so salutary in its effect. A dissenting judge took the view that Rule
1252 should be interpreted so as to permit the attachment subject to
the application of the doctrine of forum non convenzens.7
Rule 1252 does not affect any fundamental change in the basic
requirements for a proceeding by attachment.8 Prior to obtaining a
2Pa. Rules of Court 1252 (ig6o).
TPa. Stat. Ann. tit. 12 P.S. § 2891 (1951).
4 Originally the writ was limited to ex contractu actions; however, the writ
was gradually extended to ex delicto actions. Numerous amendments were passed
which eventually extended the writ of attachment to property within the Com-
monwealth owned by nonresidents for torts committed within the Commonwealth.
A complete statutory history is provided in the opinion and footnotes of Alpers
v. Jersey Bell Tel. Co., 403 Pa. 626, 17o A.2d 36o (ig6i).
64o3 Pa. 626, 17o A.2d 360 (i96i).
6In doing so the plaintiff relied upon Pa. Rules of Court 1252 (1960).
'See note 24 infra.
9"The foreign attachment proceeding is firmly established in Pennsylvania.
Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp. v. Bellanca Corp., 391 Pa. 177, 137 A.2d 248
(1958); Falk & Co. v, South Texas Cotton Oil Co., 368 Pa. 199, 82 A.2d 27, 31
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writ of foreign attachment, the plaintiff must show: (i) that the de-
fendant is a nonresident (or foreign corporation) on whom personal
service cannot be obtained, and (2) that tangible or intangible prop-
erty belonging to the defendant is within the forum when the attach-
ment is served upon the garnishee. 9 Upon meeting these requirements,
the writ of foreign attachment will issue and a suit quasz-zn-rem' 0 will
be formally instituted whereby the plaintiff may proceed against
the property of the defendant, rather than against the defendant's
person.
The question arises as to why the firmly established quast-zn-rem
action, as commenced by writ of foreign attachment, should serve to
change the substantive rights of parties" who seek recovery for a
transitory cause of action.12 Permitting the writ to issue for a transitory
tort, irrespective of its origin, does not affect a change of substance,
for the substantive law of the state wherein the cause of action arose
will still control the liability imposed.' 3
It is equally difficult to understand what jurisdictional change
would be made by Rule 1252. The word jurisdiction is undoubtedly
difficult to define, since the term is used in two different general con-
texts: (i) jurisdiction over the person, and (2) jurisdiction over the
subject matter. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is involved here
since the action is one quasn-in-rem. Jurisdiction over the subject
matter refers to the nature of the cause of action and the relief sought.
(1951); David E. Kennedy Co. v. Schleindl, 29o Pa. 38, 137 At. 815 (1227); Ray-
mond v. Leishman, 243 Pa. 64, 89 At. 791, 793 (1914).
OPa. Rules of Court 1252 (196o).
10A judgment in rem affects the interests of all persons in designated property.
A judgment quasi-in-rem affects the interests of particular persons in designated
property and is of two types: (i) where the plaintiff seeks to secure a pre-existing
claim in the subject property and exclude all other claims by third persons, and
(2) where the plaintiff seeks to apply what he concedes to be the property of the
defendant to the satisfaction of a claim against him. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S.
225, 246 (1958); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 723 (1877); Fairchild Engine &
Airplane Corp. v. Bellanca Corp., 391 Pa. 177, 137 A.2d 248, 250 (1958). Restate-
ment, Judgments §§ 73, 74, 75, 76 (1942).
"For a similar case relating to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
effect of a federal rule on the substantive rights of parties see Sibbach v. Wilson
& CO., 312 U.S. 1 (1940).
"Transitory actions are such personal actions as seek only the recovery of
money or chattels whether the action is in tort or contract. The underlying
theory is founded on the supposed violation of rights which in contemplation
of law have no locality. Livingston v.'Jefferson, 15 Fed. Cas. 66o (No. 8411) (C.C.D.
Va. 18ii); Solomon v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 187 Va. 240, 46 S.E.2d 369 (1948).
"3Western Union v. Brown, 234 U.S. 542, 547 (1914); Smith v. Pennsylvania R.R.,
304 Pa. 294, 156 At. 89 (1931); Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 12o N.E.
198 (1918); Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 378 (1934)-
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This is conferred by sovereign authority which organizes the court,
and is found in the general nature of the court's powers.14 Certainly,
it is within the nature of the court's power to render a judgment on
a transitory cause of action for a personal injury.'5 As to the property
itself, the tribunals of a state may subject property within its juris-
diction, although owned by nonresidents, to the payment of the de-
mands of its own citizens without infringing upon the sovereignty of
the state wherein the defendant resides. 1
If permitted, the extension would not constitute a novel change.
Other jurisdictions provide for writs of foreign attachment in actions
ex delicto irrespective of where the cause of action arose;' 7 however,
the writ varies in its application depending upon the jurisdiction. New
York courts are reluctant to entertain suits commenced by writ of
foreign attachment when both parties are nonresidents of the state, but
if the plaintiff is a resident s of New York then the suit will be enter-
tained.' 9 Illinois is more liberal in that a nonresident plaintiff may
attach property of a nonresident defendant when such property is
within the state.20 Indiana also provides for a writ of foreign attach-
ment for actions ex delicto irrespective of the parties' residence.
21
Even though the court concluded that the rule authorized foreign
attachments, the writ would not necessarily issue as a matter of right.
In the recent case of Plum v. Tampax Co., 22 the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court adopted the discretionary doctrine of forum non convenzens.
23
Simply stated, the doctrine is that a court may refuse to accept a case
even when the jurisdictional requirements are met, provided there
is a more convenient forum. By applying this doctrine,2 4 the courts
"Cooper v. Reynolds, 77 U.S. 3o8, 316 (87o).
21See note 12 supra.
1OPennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 723 (1877); Weiner v. American Ins. Co., 224
Pa. 292, 73 At. 443 (9o9); Restatement, Conflict of Laws § io6 (1934).
'-N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 902 (i96o); Ill. Ann. Stat. c. ii § 11 (1951); Ind. Ann.
Stat. § 3-5o (1946).
"Reese & Green, That Elusive Word, "'Residence," 6 Vand. L. Rev. 561 (953).
"Palmer v. The Gillette Co., 285 App. Div. 1156, 14o N.Y.S.2d 201 (2d Dep't
1955); Hoolahan v. United States Lines Co., 189 Misc. 168, 70 N.Y.S.2d 356 (Sup.
Ct. 1947); see also Annot., 14 A.L.R.2d 405 (1948).
-"Missoun Pac. R.R. v. Flannigan, 47 Ill. App. 322 (1893).
nShedd v. Calumet Constr. Co., 27o Fed. 942 (7th Cir. 1921).
'339 Pa. 533, 16o A.2d 549 (1960).
2The applicability of the doctrine within the states was formally recognized
by the Supreme Court in Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629, 643 (1935). The doc-
trine was later recognized in the federal courts in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330
U.S. 501 (1947).
2"Pennsylvania has expressly approved the doctrine as stated in the Restatement,
Conflict of Laws § 117(e) (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1957). See Plum v. Tampax Corp.,
